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NATURAL LAW AND BONA FIDE 
DISCRIMINATION: THE EVOLVING 
UNDERSTANDING OF SEX, GENDER,  
AND TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 
IN EMPLOYMENT 
KYLIE BYRON

 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Note is to discuss the existence and practicality of 
sex-based Bona Fide Occupational Qualifications BFOQs in the wake of 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s Macy v. Holder 
decision. In Macy, using a social constructionist lens, the EEOC held that 
gender identity discrimination is per se sex discrimination. This Note 
argues that the nature of sex as a social construction, rather than as a 
biological determinant, makes the historical textualist and natural law 
approaches to sex-based BFOQs intellectually arbitrary, entirely 
impractical, and in some situations incredibly dangerous. 
Part I of this Note will focus on definitions of the terms and 
classifications this Note will use and align them with the terms used by 
various judicial bodies over the course of the evolution of transgender 
terminology. This part will also develop a short background of the 
treatment of gender and sex in employment discrimination law and lay the 
foundation for the current natural law theory of gender and sex, as well as 
the understanding of sex from a social constructionist viewpoint. Part II of 
this Note will discuss and develop the Macy v. Holder decision and the 
evolution in employment law jurisprudence that allowed the outcome. It 
will also discuss the still-extant remnants of the natural law system in 
employment, and highlight the language, prejudice, and inequality that this 
school of thought produces and encourages. Part III of this Note will focus 
specifically on sex-based BFOQs, their traditional role and purpose under 
Title VII of the Equal Rights Act, and the harms they currently create in 
their role as bastions of natural law. These harms will be evaluated with 
respect to the interests of the employees to whom they apply and of the 
persons for whom those employees are responsible. 
 
 
  Senior Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. (2014), Washington 
University School of Law. 
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I. DEVELOPING A BACKGROUND FOR DISCUSSION OF GENDER IDENTITY 
AND NATURAL LAW 
Transgender persons are in a unique position with regard to the 
operation of the legal system. Different jurisdictions assign transgender 
persons their gender and sex roles—and therefore, their rights and 
responsibilities—in different ways depending upon one’s medical history, 
gender presentation, psychological evaluation, and sexual orientation. 
Gender identity is not limited to a particular race, class, religion, or 
orientation. Therefore, it creates intersectional issues unique to each 
individual it affects.
1
 Medical standards of care have been evolving along 
with the terminology, leaving legal authorities who relied upon past 
psychological definitions with an antiquated understanding of gender 
identity and sex.
2
 Only recently have courts embraced a constructionist 
understanding of those terms. Unified legal understandings are just 
beginning to emerge as a matter of practical jurisprudence.
3
  
A. Gender Identity Discovered and Defined 
It is useful to identify a standard vocabulary for the purposes of 
discussion because terminology relating to gender and sexuality has varied 
historically within American transgender-related jurisprudence.
4
 The word 
“transgender”5 is used here as an umbrella term for anyone who identifies 
or expresses their gender in a fashion different from normative standards 
 
 
 1. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation 
of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro-American Law and Society, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 
1, 395 (1994). Valdes discusses Queer Theory and the necessity of understanding and analyzing each 
individual case with the particularity required to appreciate the way in which queer identity intersects 
with race, culture, class, and religion.  
 2. Transgender individuals have historically experienced significant pathologizing of their 
particular experience. Many legal authorities refer to diagnoses of “transgenderism,” which is fading 
as an accepted medical standard. Likewise, because gender and sex refer to identity rather than 
medical diagnosis, such diagnosis should be phased out of legal standards. The DSM-IV still 
pathologizes transgender individuals as having “gender identity disorder.” The new revision to the 
DSM, DSM-V, refines this terminology to “gender dysphoria” to reflect an understanding that the 
anguish transgender people sometimes experience is not an element of gender identity itself, but 
instead a reaction to the way they are treated by the external world. See Lisa Leff, Transgender 
Advocates Seek New Diagnostic Terms, WIS. GAZETTE, July 23 2012, http://www.wisconsingazette 
.com/breaking-news/transgender-advocates-seek-new-diagnostic-terms.html. 
 3. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From 
Malignant to Benign to Productive, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1357 (2010). 
 4. Transgenderism, Transvestitism, and Transsexualism, in particular, have been used 
interchangeably and frequently so.  
 5. National Center for Transgender Equality, Transgender Terminology (Jan. 2014), 
http://transequality.org/Resources/NCTE_TransTerminology.pdf. 
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of masculinity and femininity.
6
 For all individuals whose primary or 
secondary sexual characteristics, hormone levels, or chromosomal 
arrangement differ from normative beliefs of sex-ideal anatomy, 
hormones, or chromosomal arrangement, this paper will use the accepted 
term “intersex.” These definitions are also particularly useful from a 
critical theory perspective, as they disentangle and reunify the concepts of 
gender and sex. If sex is viewed as an immutable, biological constant, and 
gender defined by a deviation or adherence to norms that arise from that 
biological constant, then as a matter of legal necessity, courts are forced to 
deal with two sets of law where sex is concerned: they must deal with the 
natural law of sex and with the constructive law of gender.
7
 However, if 
sex and gender are both social constructs, and sex is defined by gender 
expression, then the law is not required to bifurcate sex and gender in 
order to create a comprehensive and consistent jurisprudence.  
Traditionally, the social understanding was that gender is defined by 
one’s sex.8 Judith Butler and Katherine Franke posit that it is now more 
accurate to state that sex and gender are both social constructions based 
upon gender stereotype.
9
 Gender and sex are both performative traits from 
birth.
10
 As a result, rather than determining sex on the basis of biology and 
anatomy, the way in which one acts and presents oneself may indicate 
gender separately from sex.
11
 In this way, individuals may be outwardly 
identifiable as masculine women, feminine men, and other combinations 
 
 
 6. This umbrella includes identities that are nuanced and distinct from each other, and does not 
limit itself to strict binary identies. Genderqueer persons (who maintain a gender identity neither 
strictly male nor strictly female), drag queens and kings, transsexuals, and others who do not 
necessarily identify specifically as “transgender” are included for the purpose of utility. Id. This use is 
only to help align legal definitions through a constructionist lens, not to restrict, subsume, and/or label 
those or any other identities. This use does not intrinsically incorporate sexual orientation. This is 
primarily because the U.S. legal system has so far segregated gender and sex from sexual orientation 
when laws refer to “sex” or “gender,” and therefore separation is necessary for the purpose of 
articulating this particular argument. Lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, and asexual individuals certainly 
experience discrimination because those orientations are not gender-normative, i.e., heterosexual, 
expressions of attraction. When quoting holdings, I will hew to the terms used by the authority in 
question, noting when those terms are used by the authority to connote meanings different from my 
use of “transgender.” All names used will be the preferred names of the parties in question, and 
pronouns will reflect those parties’ gender identity. Again, I will note when legal authorities use 
pronouns or names that differ from the individual’s preferred name or pronoun, to retain clarity while 
respecting the party in question.  
 7. Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1343. 
 8. Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation 
of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995). 
 9. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 136 (1990); Franke, supra note 8, at 5. 
 10. Franke, supra note 8, at 52. 
 11. Valdes, supra note 1, at 134. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that affirmatively indicate both gender and sex, whether or not these traits 
align with typical social expectations. 
There is a key absurdity to a determination of sex based upon biology 
as well. Determination of “biological sex” is typically made by a single 
doctor, based solely on one’s appearance at birth. This appearance is not 
determinative of sex or of gender; it only tests external shape, which can 
be fundamentally misleading.
12
 This determination is put down onto a 
piece of paper, and for almost all of the state’s purposes, one’s legal sex is 
whatever appears on that piece of paper. It is relevant that this 
determination is a matter of law rather than fact, since there is no 
jurisdiction that submits a person’s sex to a jury as a fact to be found.13 
This method reflects the arbitrary nature of legal sexual classification. 
Courts may turn to medical reports, family histories, or to religious 
doctrine for this determination.
14
 Tellingly, this is purely a legal 
imposition: the matter may be settled without recourse to testimony of the 
person whose sex is being determined. Either physical appearance or 
anatomy
15
 is used as the sole justification for the determination.
16
  
Even without gendered complication, the “plain meaning” of sex is still 
internally fallacious. A significant portion of the population is born with 
anatomy, genetic patterns, or other gender markers that do not fit a 
normative understanding of “male” or “female” biology. These persons, 
and anyone else whose biology does not match a normative idea of a 
binary sex, are typically grouped under the umbrella of “intersex.” It has 
been accepted practice to surgically alter intersex children shortly after 
birth in order to create a more socially normative anatomy long before 
they have had any chance to form a gender identity. In such a case, the 
doctor decides based upon ease and safety of procedure which of the 
perceived binary roles the child will be altered to fit. Many children who 
 
 
 12. Franke, supra note 8, at 52. Anatomical genital shape at birth can be misleading, as it does 
not necessarily determine the child’s gender identity and it does not necessitate the existence (or 
nonexistence) of any other physical sexual characteristic, including hormones, gonads, and  
chromosomes, as will be discussed later in this Note. 
 13. Matthew Gayle, Note, Female By Operation of Law: Feminist Jurisprudence and the Legal 
Imposition of Sex, 12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 737, 747 (2006). To ask whether sex is a matter of 
fact or law is a difficult and troubling question. To have one’s sex voted on or determined by a third 
party is a terrifying and intrusive prospect, whether that party is a judicial authority or a body of fact-
finders, and such a proceeding is an indignity to which few people of any gender or sex would 
willingly submit. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Again, I am not asserting that the use of genes, genetic markers, or anatomy to determine sex 
is a prudent or useful procedure. I only wish to illustrate the temptation to believe that this particular 
course is somehow simpler, more accurate, or more indicative of fact than any other.  
 16. Gayle, supra note 13, at 747. 
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have undergone these procedures are never told the true purpose of the 
surgeries that they must continue to undergo every few years in order to 
maintain that normative structure.
17
 In this fashion, the illusion that only 
two biological sexual configurations exist is maintained and a veil is 
drawn over the truly constructive nature of sex. 
B. Natural Law and The Plain Meaning of Sex 
The trend within the judiciary of using the “plain meaning” of the word 
“sex” in the context of discrimination is itself a throwback to natural law, 
enforced by textualist jurisprudence. A plain meaning reading requires that 
jurists hew to ancient definitions of “male,” “female,” and “sex” rather 
than develop their own constructive understanding of these words based 
upon history and modern usage. The natural law history forces those 
words into traditional normative biological frames. Within these frames, 
“sex” is defined as anatomical structure. “Male” is defined as a person 
whose anatomical structure at birth is composed of external testes and a 
penis alone. “Female” is defined as a person whose anatomical structure at 
birth is composed of internal ovaries, a vagina, and uterus. There is no 
frame at all for individuals whose biology or identity does not hew to 
those standards, which has resulted in a sparse jurisprudence regarding 
intersex
18
 and transgender persons. Over the past few decades, 
 
 
 17. Milton Diamond, Pediatric Management of Ambiguous and Traumatized Genitalia, 162 J. 
UROLOGY, 1021, 1024 (1999). The practice of surgically altering ambiguous genitalia has a 
particularly tragic history. Pioneered initially by Dr. John Money of Johns Hopkins University, it 
became accepted practice to perform “corrective surgery” on children under two years of age whose 
genitalia were ambiguous. Id. Diamond goes on to write: 
Since the appearance of the genitalia is considered crucial, surgery should decrease genital 
ambiguity. In females any large clitoris is to be reduced or removed. In males with a less than 
adequate penis the preferred surgical approach is sex reassignment . . . . There should be no 
change in gender after [two] years. 
Id. at 1021. For intersex children surgically altered and raised as a particular gender, a pattern 
emerges: they discover discontent with their gender identity, but counseling and access to their 
medical records are denied them. Id. at 1024. This surgery and the subsequent denial of access to 
records was the prevalent manner of treatment for over forty years. Id. Patients were children with 
androgen insensitivity, chromosomal conditions such as Klinefelter Syndrome, conditions referred to 
at the time as “hermaphroditism,” and any individual child whose penis was deemed “too small” or 
whose clitoris was deemed “too large.” Id. at 1021. Note that the primary feature linking all cases of 
surgery stems from the appearance of genitalia, which was considered “crucial” by the medical 
establishment. Not only is this procedure incredibly cruel, but it effectively forces ambiguous 
individuals against their will into the natural law sexual binary, thus preserving, either intentionally or 
through common but separate normative values, the illusion that sex is a strictly binary and immutable 
physical trait rather than simply a label imposed upon an individual.  
 18. “Intersex” as a term is itself inclusive of a large range of physical, chromosomal, and 
hormonal differentiations, including and replacing the now-pejorative terminology “hermaphrodite.” 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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jurisprudence has drifted away from natural law definitions of gender and 
sexual orientation.
19
 This model of gender theory developed as a legal 
institution in the nineteenth century: sex meant gender, and gender, in 
turn, meant biology.
20
 This ancient model links gender roles and traditions 
to sex, and out of those roles and traditions grows a social order. Gendered 
values—Man as breadwinner, Woman as housewife; Man as aggressive, 
Woman as passive—were enshrined in law, with the purpose of 
discouraging or eliminating contra-gender behavior.
21
 These values do not 
grow out of any rational purpose but a will to cleave to the status quo. For 
the in-power group—white, heterosexual, gender-normative men—it 
became important to preserve a power structure centered around the 
political and moral dominance of white, heterosexual, gender-normative 
men.
22
 As time passed, however, in the century between 1861 and 1961, 
and in response to increasingly visible deviations from natural law gender 
and sex standards, “America’s governing classes responded by 
modernizing and medicalizing the morals-based natural law model, and 
mobilizing state administrative structures to give legal force to the 
traditionalist norm.”23 Voting rights, marriage rights, and property rights 
grew out of this adjustment, but prescriptions remained at the core. Gender 
and sex still both meant biology, and to stray too far from those norms was 
to risk being labeled as “unnatural” or “perverted.”24 
These natural law values underpin our basic modern sex discrimination 
practices as a result. Sex discrimination laws are built upon the essentialist 
concept that “masculine” and “feminine” are packages in which all 
gendered behaviors are packed up and bundled together with a physical 
sex organ. Looking deeper into this essentialist natural-law concept, 
 
 
The latter term is still occasionally in use in medical and scientific terminology. This Note does not 
intend to conflate the concerns and difficulties faced respectively by intersex and transgender persons. 
Both groups see a wide variety of challenges to identity and authenticity in every range of life, and 
these challenges are certainly unique both to the individual and to the individual’s identity. For the 
purposes of understanding the effects of strictly sexed natural law language on the workplace, 
however, it is necessary to understand that both intersex and transgender persons are affected, and their 
experiences erased. A natural law jurisprudence requires such erasure, because if transgender and 
intersex persons are recognized as authentic then the natural-law sex binary is revealed to be either a 
constructed falsehood or an absurdity of assumption; as a result, both demographics suffer 
consequences in both sexed and gendered circumstances, though such consequences take very 
different form. 
 19. Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1340. “Sex,” however, has not seen the same movement in the eye 
of the law. 
 20. Id. at 1336. 
 21. See id. at 1339. 
 22. Id. at 1336. 
 23. Id. at 1340. 
 24. Id. at 1339–40. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/4
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however, causes the assumed structure to crumble. Almost all sex 
discrimination is itself gender stereotyping. Ilona Turner notes that when 
an employer wishes to limit job applicants to men or women, that 
employer is not doing so because it requires particular sexual organs to do 
the job in question.
25
 Instead, the employer desires the normative values, 
abilities, and securities that are generally thought to arise from biological 
sex.
26
 These normative values include heterosexuality; an attraction to 
women is entangled within an assumption of maleness, and vice versa.
27
 
By linking sex to gender, linking both to sexual orientation, and then 
manufacturing a purpose for doing so, jurists continue to uphold the 
essentialist order of natural law. 
In contrast, a constructionist view draws from the understandings set 
forth by queer and feminist theorists such as Franke and Butler. 
Specifically, the construction view asserts that the performative nature of 
gender and sex mean that we must take into account each individual 
identity and performance before or instead of categorizing them for the 
purpose of legal definition and evaluation.
28
 By following this model, I 
believe that it is possible to create a more organized, flexible body of law 
than one that must torment itself by aligning with outdated and erroneous 
understandings of sex.  
II. MACY V. HOLDER AND TRANSGENDER EMPLOYEE PROTECTION 
A. Gender Stereotyping and Pathologizing: Ulane v. Eastern Airlines 
In considering transgender classification for employment purposes, 
many federal courts treat sex discrimination as a “plain language” natural 
 
 
 25. Ilona M. Turner, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees and Title VII, 95 CALIF. 
L. REV. 561, 565 (2007). 
 26. Id. at 564–65. 
 27. Id. at 572. Sexual orientation, perhaps wrongly conflated with gender identity, remains a 
sticking point in the adoption of constructionist philosophies of sex. This difficulty is because while 
transgender identity is not a sexual orientation, nor does it denote a particular sexual orientation, 
sexual orientation is itself primarily found objectionable both socially and under the law because the 
act of being attracted to a person of the same sex, or people of all sexes, or of no sex, is itself a 
deviation from the normative gender standards for men and women. Valdes, supra note 1, at 14–17. 
Turner notes that the prevention of sex discrimination based on a theory of sexual orientation, while 
“logically and morally persuasive,” is unlikely to succeed at a federal level “because of a near 
unanimity of the federal courts” to accord sexual orientation protection under such a theory. Turner, 
supra note 25, at n.66. With the recent recognition of LGB people as a potentially protected class 
under Windsor, however, such standards may be due to change. 
 28. Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1359–60. Eskridge refers to a similar model as the “post-liberal” 
model of sex and gender theory. Id. at 1358. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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law issue rather than a constructionist one. In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines,
29
 
the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff, a commercial airline pilot and 
decorated Vietnam War veteran, was not protected by Title VII after 
undergoing gender transition because the language of the statute spoke 
only to “sex” and not to what the court termed “sexual identity” or “sexual 
preference.”30 The court restricted Title VII claims to issues of 
discrimination regarding “biological males” and “biological females”31— 
thereby excluding transgender
32
 individuals entirely.
33
 The language the 
court uses is telling: it did not treat Ms. Ulane’s gender identity as 
authentic. The language itself is laced with suspicion and prejudice.
34
 The 
court “viewed Ulane as essentially an impostor, merely masquerading as 
female . . . .”35 This view serves as a perfect example of the central 
injustice in plain meaning jurisprudence regarding transgender persons. 
This pattern of pathology extends across several circuits within the Federal 
Court system.
36
 To understand the pathologizing of gender states that fall 
 
 
 29. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 30. Id. at 1085–86. The conflation of sexual identity and orientation is not a new concept, and it 
is to the Ulane trial court’s credit that it acknowledges a difference between sex and sexual identity 
and even attempts to find a line to draw between the two. Id. 
 31. Id. at 1087. It is notable that the language used by the Seventh Circuit here segregates 
transgender individuals from “biological males” and “biological females,” regardless of biological or 
medical history. I do not argue that biology or medicine should be accounted for in determining gender 
status, but by making this distinction the court potentially creates a standard where transgender 
individuals cannot ever receive protection under Title VII under any set of circumstances.  
 32. The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Ulane uses the term “transsexual” rather than 
“transgender.” The holding defines transsexual as a person discontented with their biological sex but 
does not make medical treatment a condition for the term, which is a description that aligns more 
closely with the modern term “transgender.” The Seventh Circuit does make psychological diagnosis a 
condition, but this psychological diagnosis is no longer a medical standard. See Eli Coleman et al., 
Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender, and Gender-Nonconforming People, 
Version 7, 13 INT’L J. TRANSGENDERISM, 165, 167 (2011). The term as used here is therefore archaic, 
and not strictly appropriate for differentiation. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1083, n.3. 
 33. Turner, supra note 25, at 580. See also Dobre v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 850 F. Supp. 
284, 286–87 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that a person who wishes to begin gender transition does not 
receive protection under Title VII). 
 34. Turner, supra note 25, at 569. For example, sentences such as “Ulane is entitled to any 
personal belief about her sexual identity she desires” and “[Ulane is] a biological male who takes 
female hormones, cross-dresses, and has surgically altered parts of her body to make it appear to be 
female.” Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1087. 
 35. Turner, supra note 25, at 569. 
 36. Not all jurists in such circuits support the pathologization and othering of transgender 
persons, of course, nor does this paper suggest that they do. However, when a higher court uses 
pathologizing language, that court builds that stigma directly into the law; jurists at lower levels of 
court, who may see more cases involving transpeople than those at appellate levels, are bound to rule 
under pathologizing language used by the higher courts. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/4
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outside of the delineations of natural law, it is educational to turn to Judge 
Richard Posner’s definition of “transsexual” in Maggert v. Hanks37:  
Gender dysphoria—the condition in which a person believes that he 
is imprisoned in a body of the wrong sex, that though biologically a 
male (the more common form of the condition) he is “really” a 
female—is a serious psychiatric disorder, as we know because the 
people afflicted by it will go to great lengths to cure it if they can 
afford the cure. The cure for the male transsexual consists not of 
psychiatric treatment designed to make the patient content with his 
biological sexual identity—that doesn’t work—but of estrogen 
therapy designed to create the secondary sexual characteristics of a 
woman followed by the surgical removal of the genitals and the 
construction of a vagina-substitute out of penile tissue. . . . Someone 
eager to undergo this mutilation is plainly suffering from a profound 
psychiatric disorder.
38
 
Posner, one of the most highly regarded jurists of our age, did not simply 
refer to the medical definition at the time; he took particular care to imply 
that transgender persons were inauthentic sexual impersonators as well as 
clinically and socially insane. By using “believes,” Posner suggests 
inauthenticity of the transgender person’s gender identity. Quotation 
marks denoting sarcasm placed around the word “really” with regards to 
gender identity go further: Posner suggests that not only is the person’s 
gender identity not authentic, but it could never truly be authentic. The 
suggestion that a person would willingly undergo “mutilation” to relieve 
anguish is portrayed as indicative of insanity. In almost all circumstances, 
one does not typically refer to surgery that assuages otherwise inescapable 
anguish as “mutilation,” nor does one typically pathologize those who 
undergo such surgery. This use of language to declaim gender non-
conforming individuals as deranged or abnormal is consistent with the 
pattern of natural law jurisprudence as it developed through the 1960s as 
observed by Eckridge. The legal use of stigma and pathologization results 
in a reduction of the regime-threatening behavior.
39
 
 
 
 37. Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997). Maggert was, at its core, a case about the 
quality and specificity of treatment that a transgender woman housed in a men’s prison was entitled to 
receive under the Eighth Amendment. 
 38. Id. at 671.  
 39. Eskridge, supra note 3, at 1339–40. 
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B. The Supreme Court Adopts Gender Construction Theory 
The Supreme Court did not rule on the contest between constructive 
and plain meaning values of gender and sex until Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins.
40
 Hopkins, a woman and senior manager at Price Waterhouse, 
was passed over for partnership despite her excellent job performance on 
the basis that her behavior, manner of dress, and physical appearance were 
overly masculine.
41
 Hopkins was the only woman candidate proposed for 
partnership that year, and she was subsequently deferred. The gender-
centric statements of the other partners show a clear use of gender 
stereotyping in the rationalization of her deferral.  
One partner described her as “macho”; another suggested that she 
“overcompensated for being a woman”; a third advised her to take 
“a course at charm school.” Several partners criticized her use of 
profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those partners 
objected to her swearing only “because it’s a lady using foul 
language.” Another supporter explained that Hopkins “ha[d] 
matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed mgr 
[sic] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady 
ptr [sic] candidate.” But it was the man who, as Judge Gesell found, 
bore responsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the 
Policy Board’s decision to place her candidacy on hold who 
delivered the coup de grace: in order to improve her chances for 
partnership, Thomas Beyer advised, Hopkins should “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear 
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”42  
The Court found that her deferral and the reasons given for that deferral 
were unacceptable sex discrimination under Title VII. The Court reasoned 
that prohibitions against sex discrimination included prohibitions against 
discrimination against those who did not conform to sexual norms and 
stereotypes.
43
 The Court wrote, “[a]s for the legal relevance of sex 
stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype 
 
 
 40. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 41. Id. at 235. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 251. 
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associated with their group . . . .”44 While Price Waterhouse did not 
specifically extend to transgender employees, it laid the groundwork for 
the understanding that gender stereotyping is itself sex stereotyping, and in 
doing so began to align the Court’s understanding of the gender-sex 
relationship with the social constructionist theory. 
By disclaiming the socially normative belief that a biological 
configuration necessitates a specifically gendered behavior, the Court 
acknowledged that gender and sex are not inextricably linked, and, in fact, 
need not coincide in normative fashion at all for the purposes of sex 
discrimination in employment. This indicates a constructionist, rather than 
natural law, theory of gender, though the court did not go so far as to 
indicate a similarly constructionist notion of sex. Following Price 
Waterhouse, federal court decisions have split over the role that gender 
stereotyping plays in employment discrimination cases involving 
transgender plaintiffs. 
The Eleventh Circuit specifically extended Price Waterhouse to apply 
to transgender individuals in Glenn v. Brumby,
45
 on the basis that the Price 
Waterhouse rationale extended to all individuals discriminated against 
because of their nonconformance with gender stereotypes.
46
 Because 
“[t]he very acts that define transgender people as transgender are those 
that contradict stereotypes of gender-appropriate appearance and 
behavior”47 there is “a congruence between discriminating against 
transgender and transsexual individuals and discrimination on the basis of 
gender-based behavioral norms. Accordingly, discrimination against a 
transgender individual because of her gender-nonconformity is sex 
discrimination, whether it is described as being on the basis of sex or 
gender.”48 The Sixth and First Circuits have also followed suit, in Smith v. 
City of Salem
49
 and Rosa v. Park West Bank & Trust Co.,
50
 respectively. 
 
 
 44. Id.  
 45. 663 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011). Glenn v. Brumby concerned the case of an editor fired by the 
Georgia Assembly’s Office of Legislative Council when she announced that she planned to begin 
transition and present as a woman at the office. Id. According to her supervisor, Brumby, Glenn was 
terminated because “Glenn’s intended gender transition was inappropriate, that it would be disruptive, 
that some people would view it as a moral issue, and that it would make Glenn’s coworkers 
uncomfortable.” Id. at 1314. 
 46. Id. at 1316. 
 47. Turner, supra note 25, at 563. 
 48. Glenn, 663 F.3d at 1316–17. 
 49. 378 F.3d 566 (6th Cir. 2004). In Smith, the Sixth Circuit held that a firefighter who was fired 
for undergoing gender transition and presenting as female was impermissibly discriminated against on 
the basis of her nonconformance with masculine gender norms. Id. at 570–72. 
 50. 214 F.3d 213 (1st Cir. 2000). Rosa differs somewhat from Smith in that Rosa concerned a 
bank whose employee refused a heterosexual male patron a loan when said patron wore a dress and 
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On the other hand, the Western District of Missouri held in Broadus v. 
State Farm Ins. Co.
51
 that Price Waterhouse did not speak directly to the 
issue of discrimination against transgender employees, because Hopkins 
was not herself “a transsexual. Rather, she was a female employee at an 
accounting firm who was advised to ‘walk more femininely, talk more 
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry . . . .’”52 While the Broadus court did not specifically 
rule out the possibility that Price Waterhouse could apply to transgender 
employees, the court took the proactive natural law step of differentiating 
a transgender employee from a person whose gender and sex the court 
perceived to be authentic. As in Ulane, creating this differentiation 
suggests that the transgender person is somehow not truly a man or a 
woman. It sets the employee apart as “other,” and suggests suspicion, 
distrust, and inauthenticity. It hews directly to the natural law fallacy that a 
binary sex exists, and that to transgress gender boundaries in a certain way 
makes one ineligible for inclusion under either sex.  
Similarly, the Eastern District of Louisiana in Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., 
Inc.
53
 held that Price Waterhouse did not apply in the case of the firing of 
Oiler, a transgender woman who presented as female only outside of 
work,
54
 under the rationale that sexual orientation and gender identity do 
not fall under the plain meaning of sex,
55
 which itself refers strictly to 
biological formation.
56
 The Oiler court’s terminology is a bit more 
confused in this case: the court identifies Oiler as a “transgender” 
“heterosexual man” with “gender identity disorder” and “transvestic 
fetishism,” but the court specifies that he is specifically not a transsexual.57 
The utility of the court’s differentiation is questionable. There is no reason 
to distinguish between different variations on gender non-conformity if the 
end product of the ruling is that that no subclassification of transgender 
identity can receive protection under a theory of gender discrimination. 
 
 
makeup when applying. The loan clerk instructed him to go home and change out of the feminine 
attire he was wearing. Id. at 214. Rosa concerned the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1691–1691f, which refers to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act for definitions of discrimination, and 
though the First Circuit did not find sex discrimination based upon the facts of the case the court 
acknowledged that had the clerk refused Rosa a loan on the basis of his attire, such action would have 
been sex stereotyping and therefore impermissible discrimination. Id. at 215–16. 
 51. No. 98-4254-CV-C-SOW-ECF, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19919, *11 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 
2000). 
 52. Id. 
 53. No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). 
 54. Id. at *32. 
 55. Id. at *19-21. 
 56. Id. at *20-23. 
 57. Id. at *4. 
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This description is heavily pathological, however, and indeed the court 
later states that Oiler “is a man . . . [who] publicly disguise[s] himself as a 
woman, wears women’s clothing . . . [and] pretends to be a woman . . . .”58 
As in Ulane, the court differentiates from Price Waterhouse on the basis 
of the fact that Hopkins (of Price Waterhouse) never “pretended to be a 
man . . . .”59 As with Ulane and Broadus, the Oiler court’s language 
betrays the court’s fundamental distrust of a person it sees as deceptive, 
mentally ill, and guilty of transgressing the natural law boundaries 
between gender and sex. 
C. Macy v. Holder and the Constructionist Theory of Sex 
In May of 2012, the EEOC handed down a landmark decision in Macy 
v. Holder.
60
 Mia Macy, a veteran and former police detective,
61
 applied for 
a job with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms at the Walnut 
Creek crime lab.
62
 This application occurred before her transition from 
male to female, while Macy was still presenting as a man. Her unique 
expertise in ballistics qualified her for the job. Macy’s experience included 
“[certification] as a National Integrated Ballistics Information Network . . . 
operator and a BrassTrax ballistics investigator.”63 While on the phone 
with the Director of the Walnut Creek lab, Macy was told she would have 
the job pending a successful background investigation. A few months 
later, with the background check underway, Macy informed the contractor 
responsible for filling her position that she was undergoing gender 
transition.
64
 Five days after informing her contractor of the transition, the 
job offer was withdrawn.
65
 Two different and separate pretexts were given 
for the withdrawal of the position, neither of which was concordant with 
Macy’s understanding of her position in the application process.66  
 
 
 58. Id. at *28. 
 59. Id. at *29. 
 60. EEOC Decision No. 0120120821, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181 (Apr. 20, 2012). 
 61. Jesse McKinley, Ruling Extends Sex-Discrimination Protection to Transgender Woman 
Denied Federal Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2012, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 
04/25/us/sex-discrimination-protection-extended-to-transgender-woman.html. 
 62. Macy, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181, at *2. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at *4. 
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at *4-5. The initial alleged pretextual claim, made by the hiring director, was that budget 
considerations had eliminated the position in question. The subsequent alleged pretextual claim, made 
by the Agency EEOC counselor, was that the position was not itself cut but that another individual had 
been farther along in the background investigation. Id. 
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When she filed an EEOC complaint against the ATF, Macy did so on 
both the basis of sex discrimination and the basis of gender identity 
discrimination.
67
 The ATF asserted that Macy’s discrimination claim 
based upon gender identity, rather than the claim based upon physical sex, 
was not subject to an EEOC evaluation under Title VII.
68
 This assertion 
was based upon previous Department of Justice policy, which treated only 
sex discrimination, and not gender discrimination, as a viable Title VII 
EEOC claim.
69
 After review, the EEOC held “that claims of discrimination 
based on transgender status, also referred to as claims of discrimination 
based on gender identity, are cognizable under Title VII’s sex 
discrimination prohibition, and may therefore be processed under Part 
1614 of EEOC’s federal sector EEO complaints process.”70 Macy marked 
the first time that Title VII had been applied to gender discrimination in 
the case of transgender individuals on a federal level.  
Since Price Waterhouse did not itself address the issue of transgender 
individuals, the Macy decision was necessary in order to begin 
transformation of the legal perception of gender transition from a 
pathological aberrance
71
 to a development of identity, not unlike a change 
of religion.
72
 Since Macy will govern the EEOC’s investigation and 
enforcement of transgender-related sex discrimination claims, extant 
patterns of natural law discrimination and binary sex/gender theory will be 
made harder to implement, with one essential holdout remaining—the 
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification.  
 
 
 67. Id. at *6. 
 68. Id. at *7-8. 
 69. DEPT. OF JUST., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM (2003), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/jmd/hr/hrorder/chpt4-1.htm (DOJ Human Resources policy on sex discrimination as 
Title VII claims). 
 70. Macy, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181, at *13.  
 71. See Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (1984); Broadus v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 98-
4254-CV-C-SOW-ECF, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19919, at *11 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 11, 2000); Oiler v. 
Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417, at *4-6 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002). 
 72. Macy, 2012 EEOPUB LEXIS 1181, at *33. The notion of discrimination “during” transition 
is also particularly important here, because gender transition does not always have a conveniently 
defined medical endpoint. Many transgender individuals do not pursue medical intervention, or only 
choose to pursue certain medical treatments. Any treatments, medical or otherwise, are now tailored to 
specific patients. Coleman et al., supra note 32, at 170–71. As a result of medical needs, however, 
economic considerations, availability of insurance coverage, and access to knowledgeable medical 
professionals can all prolong a transition period. See Tracie White, Transition Point: The Unmet 
Medical Needs of Transgender People, 29 STANFORD MED. 32, 37 (2012), available at http://stanmed. 
stanford.edu/2012spring/documents/medmag_2012spring.pdf. 
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III. CONSTRUCTED SEX AND THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL 
QUALIFICATION 
Social constructionism gives a definition of gender and sex that is 
unified and elegant, founded entirely in identity rather than limited by 
biology. Defining sex and gender based on strict natural law bifurcates the 
law, makes it harder for individual courts to understand and to implement, 
and disenfranchises many individuals entirely. Biology itself is 
indeterminate with regard to anatomy, genetics, and outward physical 
characteristics. Thus, any determination made based strictly upon biology 
is essentially arbitrary. What, then, is the function of a Bona Fide 
Occupational Qualification (or “BFOQ”) based upon sex in a 
constructionist system? 
A. The BFOQ as Applied to Normative Gender and Sex 
BFOQs themselves are essentially exemptions within Title VII, 
structured so that they may allow discrimination within limited situations 
in such instances as the discrimination itself is necessary for performance 
of the job in question:  
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter . . . it shall 
not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and 
employ employees . . . on the basis of [their] religion, sex or 
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex or 
national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or 
enterprise . . . .
73
  
These BFOQs must not only be necessary to perform the duties of the job, 
but the burden is on the employer to show why the necessity of 
discrimination outweighs the harm caused by discrimination. Typically, it 
is not enough to satisfy this standard that employing a person of a 
particular race, age, sex, or religion would, for example, simply alienate 
clients or coworkers. The presumption is against the legality of any given 
BFOQ.
74
 What, then, would a BFOQ based upon a natural law assumption 
of binary biology, rather than gender, look like?  
 
 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964). 
 74. Sharon M. McGowan, The Bona Fide Body: Title VII’s Last Bastion of Intentional Sex 
Discrimination, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77, 80 (2003). 
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The binary sex construction revolves around the presence or absence of 
biological anatomy—in this case, perhaps, testes or ovaries. To draw 
strictly from this definition, a BFOQ would apply to a job that in some 
way required testes or ovaries, but not necessarily any gendered traits or 
performances that accompany them. This is immediately apparent as an 
absurdity: the presence of a particular sex organ cannot be what any but a 
miniscule handful of employers want.
75
 If we broaden the definition to 
include gender, but hold to the strict biology, we have an answer much 
closer to the modern conception. We believe that in order to perform these 
jobs, the employees must be men that look like men, act like men, sound 
like men, are attracted to women, and have a normative male anatomy. 
Women must meet the same standards respective to heterosexual 
normative-appearing women. And yet to append the anatomical 
requirement still seems somewhat absurd. After all, employers rarely 
check to make sure a potential employee’s anatomy fits the qualification, 
even in fields where BFOQs have been approved for use. Under this light, 
sex-based BFOQs seem much more like gender-normativity-based 
BFOQs. This reframing is consistent with a modern social constructionist 
understanding of sex: it is a social norm, not biology, that creates an 
outward representation of masculinity or femininity, and therefore it is that 
social norm that is desired by employers who permissibly qualify their 
employees by sex.
76
 There is, of course, a belief that certain types of work 
are suited more towards a strictly masculine or feminine body. However, 
“[m]ost other physical differences between the sexes, such as strength, are 
imperfectly correlated with sex. Indeed, studies have shown more 
significant differences among members of the same sex than between men 
and women as groups.”77 This gives the impression that BFOQs are 
generally quite broad, but in fact modern BFOQs regarding sex are fairly 
narrowly construed. Typically, they exist when a position requires actual 
or potential observation or intrusive contact with the body of another 
person.
78
 Courts have consistently recognized such BFOQ exceptions in 
cases involving corrections officers, bathroom custodians, and medical 
attendants.
79
  
 
 
 75. Some employers, of course, may desire specific primary and secondary sexual characteristics 
in their employees. Some examples that come to mind are performers, models, and sex workers. No 
stigmatization of such individuals is intended through this Note. 
 76. Turner, supra note 25, at 565. 
 77. Id. at 564 (citation omitted). 
 78. McGowan, supra note 74, at 78. 
 79. Id. at 78. 
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Courts have cited four essential factors to be considered in sex-based 
BFOQ determinations. First, the court must consider the likelihood of 
physical and sexual assault due to temptations that exist in environments 
of confinement. Second, the court considers whether that cross-sex 
observation harms the dignity of the individual observed. Third, courts 
should reinforce an environment of sexual modesty that cross-sex 
observation might endanger. Finally, courts assume that a single-sex 
environment is necessary to promote rehabilitation in environments that 
are intended to rehabilitate.
80
  
These restrictions in particular are indicative of not just gender 
stereotyping, but also of erasure of the experiences and risks of non-
heteronormative individuals within such environments. First, it is 
questionable whether or not the risk of physical or sexual assault is 
actually greater in opposite-sex situations than in same-sex situations. 
Justice Thurgood Marshall stated in his dissent in Dothard v. Rawlinson
81
 
that violent assault against a guard in a men’s prison is no more likely to 
occur against female guards than male guards, because a violent inmate 
does not attack the guard-as-woman; the inmate attacks the guard-as-
guard.
82
 Furthermore, the tactics that prison guards use to enforce security 
do not rely upon the individual physical strength of the guard, but instead 
rely on institutional power and the teamwork of units made up of multiple 
guards.
83
 
Second, if physical strength and risk are not issues necessitating a sex-
based BFOQ, then there is the allegation of dignity. Specifically, it is 
generally alleged that there is a greater invasion of privacy when a man 
sees a woman nude, or vice versa, than when two members of the same 
sex see each other. It is ridiculous to assume that this assumption is based 
upon biology. The offense is not a product of the sex organs. It is likewise 
unreasonable to believe that an anatomically male doctor is intrinsically 
 
 
 80. Id. at 87. 
 81. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Dothard v. Rawlinson concerned an Alabama prison’s policy of 
restricting applicants for prison custodial work by height and weight, certain characteristics of which 
comprised the BFOQ in the case, rather than by strength or capability. Id. at 323–24. This policy had 
the effect of excluding from prison work more than forty percent of all possible women who applied, 
but less than one percent of all men. Id. at 329–30. However, the BFOQ was upheld in Dothard due to 
a concern on the part of the Court that women would face greater risks in the prison as prison staff 
than men would, that women would be less adequate than men in their response to these risks, and that 
an inadequate response to the danger would present a threat not just to the individual prison employee 
but to everyone in the prison, as well as to the general population outside. Id. at 335–36. Justice 
Stewart framed the risk as arising directly from the “womanhood” of the applicant. Id. at 336.  
 82. Id. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 343. 
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incapable of humiliating his male patient beyond the indignity of simply 
seeing the patient nude. The assumption being made, of course, is that all 
members of the offensive transaction are entirely normative as far as sex, 
gender, and sexual orientation are concerned. By changing any one of 
those aspects of the disadvantaged person’s character, the door reopens for 
the additional indignity. A male doctor may be of the sex that meets the 
criteria for the BFOQ to treat male patients. However, if the patient 
identifies as female, or if the patient is attracted to persons of the same sex 
as the doctor, or if the doctor is attracted to persons of the patient’s sex or 
identity, then the opportunity for indignity and harm have been restored 
and perhaps worsened. Further, because there is the mistaken assumption 
that the sex-based BFOQ will protect the patient, the patient can 
potentially be more vulnerable than if there were a minimum level of 
oversight or responsibility and no BFOQ. The natural-law-based dignity 
theory behind sex-based BFOQs falls short specifically because it is 
prescriptive of gender and sexuality in a way that does not prevent harm to 
dignity in practice.
84
  
I assert a more constructionist notion: that the offense is instead 
composed of two elements. The first element is that one individual must 
be in a position of power over the other in some way, or capable of 
otherwise legally restricting the other’s action during the invasion of 
privacy that the job requires. The second element is that the person in 
power must make the disempowered person feel vulnerable in a way that 
exceeds the indignity of simply having one’s privacy violated. The first 
element defines the relationships in which such a qualification must exist. 
For example, the relationships between an orderly and a nursing home 
resident, a doctor or nurse and a patient, a prison guard and an inmate, or a 
 
 
 84. Gary J. Gates, How Many People Are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender?, THE 
WILLIAMS INST. (Apr. 2011), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Gates-How-
Many-People-LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf. This study asserts that about 3.5% of adults in the United States 
identify as lesbian or gay, and 0.3% identify as transgender, though eleven percent of surveyed 
individuals admit same sex attraction without self-identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. Id. at 1. If it 
is the attraction that creates the harm to dignity—being observed by someone who finds the sex or 
gender of the observed sexually attractive, or whose sex or gender the observed finds attractive, then 
based upon these statistics the BFOQ fails in its prescription twenty percent of the time; eleven percent 
of the time, the BFOQ will fail because the observing official will be attracted to members of the sex 
or gender of the disadvantaged person; and a further eleven percent where the disadvantaged person 
will be attracted to members of the sex or gender of the observing official, with a statistical overlap of 
one to two percent when both observer and observed have an attraction to the other’s gender, and that 
gender is normatively identical for both. In no BFOQ evaluation is it required such that the observer or 
the observed be specifically attracted to the other, all that is required is that a person of a sex or gender 
that is normatively found attractive by the other is involved in the interaction between the two 
individuals.  
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flight security officer and a passenger at their checkpoint all might suffice 
to satisfy the first requirement.  
The second element helps frame the additional vulnerability beyond 
simply a privacy invasion. If, indeed, the offense to dignity is sufficient to 
require qualification, then it is not sufficient to assume that the presence of 
a particular gender expression or sex characteristic defeats the danger 
entirely because the danger is subjective on the part of the disadvantaged 
person.  
There may be valid reason to apply qualifications to an observer, but to 
do it by sex is inaccurate and inappropriate. Since there is a presumption 
against any BFOQ, this inaccuracy weighs heavily against the institution 
of such a qualification. The natural law heritage of the qualification should 
not give it shelter or unearned legitimacy. Even in a world in which a 
textualist interpretation of sex prevails over a constructionist 
interpretation, BFOQs fail their prophylactic purpose.
85
  
B. Sex-based BFOQs and Transgender Employees 
In light of the essentially contrived purpose of the sex-based BFOQ, it 
is instructive to examine its effect when applied to transgender individuals 
in normatively sex-sensitive situations. The first issue to address is the one 
that confounds textualism: namely, what does it mean to enforce a sex-
based BFOQ where sex is socially constructed? When sex is defined as a 
“a man with normative male anatomy, or a woman with normative female 
anatomy” and transgender and intersex persons simply do not exist, a sex-
based BFOQ is simple to execute, whether justified or not. An employer 
may look at the gender marker on an employee or potential employee’s 
identification documents and be satisfied that no unwanted sex organs or 
chromosomes are entering the workplace. This employer may still have to 
deal with contra-normative-gender behavior that renders the BFOQ 
meaningless. For example, contra-normative gender behavior might 
include a normatively-gendered guard’s willingness to victimize and 
 
 
 85. McGowan, supra note 74, at 97–98. This is not to say that there is no purpose adequately 
served by qualifying observer positions in prison and medical facilities, but only that it is an 
overreaching, inaccurate solution to the problem, and a solution that victimizes some while it protects 
others. The elimination of male employees from all prisons incarcerating women would likely reduce 
the rates of rape and sexual abuse in those prisons. This action would, however, not prevent any of the 
same-sex sexual misconduct of guards against prisoners in those facilities, nor would it create 
resolution of any other harms or indignities, available to any overseer regardless of sex, that prisoners 
endure. Id. at 124. Both of these problems might be better solved by more oversight of the system 
itself, rather than by less oversight executed by single-and-same-gender overseers. Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
362 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY JURISPRUDENCE REVIEW [VOL. 6:343 
 
 
 
 
humiliate members of the same sex
86
 or a male prison guard too slight and 
weak to enforce security in a men’s prison. In such cases, the purpose of 
the BFOQ has been thwarted, but the letter of the law has been satisfied 
and nominal justice has been served. The world posited above, however, 
does not exist. Transgender and intersex employees require that we ask 
further questions of a BFOQ: are employers screening for an anatomical 
shape, a gender identity, or a gender performance that makes the job 
impracticable? 
Consider El’Jai Devoureau, a transgender man who lost his position as 
a urine monitor for men at a Camden, New Jersey drug-testing center, 
Urban Treatment Associates.
87
 The job involved watching men provide 
urine samples for later analysis. He was fired on his second day of work, 
when his employer heard that he had transitioned from female to male.
88
 
Devoureau has refused to submit or discuss his medical history.
89
 
Devoureau’s state-issued identity documents indicate that he is male.90 
Urban Treatment Associates hired him as a male and never questioned his 
sex before his firing.
91
 It is reasonable to assume that during the hiring 
process Urban Treatment Associates never anticipated that any male 
patient would object to Devoureau’s presence as a monitor, or at least they 
never anticipated that a patient would not make any sex-based objections 
to which other male monitors would not be subject. Devoureau was fired 
under the premise that masculinity is a BFOQ for the job of urinalysis 
monitor. The corollary to this premise is that despite all government-
approved documentary evidence, Urban Treatment Associates did not 
consider Devoureau to be male.  
A case such as Devoureau’s raises three issues that a court would have 
to untangle. First, who is capable of determining an employee’s legal sex? 
 
 
 86. In fairness, it cannot seriously be argued that a willingness to humiliate and victimize 
members of one’s own normative sexual group is somehow contra-gender behavior. The jurisprudence 
surrounding BFOQs and the offense to dignity theory, however, places same-sex observation on a 
pedestal, and assumes that no such same-gender violations exist, or, at least, that they do not exist in 
such a way as to outstrip the indignity of cross-sex observation. 
 87. TLDEF Helps Transgender Man Achieve Settlement in Discrimination Suit, TRANSGENDER 
LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, http://www.transgenderlegal.org/headline_show.php?id=429 (last visited 
June 26, 2014). Since the initial writing, Devoureau’s suit has reached settlement.  
 88. TLDEF Files Suit on Behalf of Transgender Man Fired from Male-Only Job, TRANSGENDER 
LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, http://www.transgenderlegal.org/headline_show.php?id=346 (last visted 
June 26, 2014). 
 89. Richard Pérez-Peña, A Lawsuit’s Unusual Question: Who is a Man?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 
2011, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/11/nyregion/11sexchange.html. 
 90. Id. Devoureau’s Georgia-issued birth certificate, New Jersey driver’s license, and Social 
Security registration all indicate that he is male. Id. 
 91. Id. 
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Does an employer’s opinion on an employee’s sex trump state documents? 
For an employer such as Urban Treatment Associates to prevail, the 
employer would have to convince a court that transgender employees 
inhabit a space outside of the natural law definitions of “male” and 
“female.” This requires a jurisprudence founded on the principles of 
Ulane, rather than Price Waterhouse, Smith, or Macy, by limiting “male” 
and “female” to the so-called plain meaning of biology, and exiling the 
transgender plaintiff to the role of outsider in lieu of accepting a 
constructive and all-encompassing understanding of sex. Further, they 
would have to show that their suspicion of their employee in the face of 
government identity documents is sufficient to place the employee in this 
outsider category.
92
  
The second issue is a determination of the circumstances under which a 
rejection of the sex marker on government-issued ID is appropriate. An 
employer that adopts a sex-based BFOQ that relies upon a “plain 
meaning” definition of sex will be faced with a particular dilemma: 
namely, how does one know that one is hiring a so-called “impostor” 
under the natural law of sex such that one may terminate or prevent the 
employment? Devoureau was outed
93
 by a rumor that he had undergone 
transition.
94
 Not every employer will have such a rumor to assist it. A 
determination based on appearance will not suffice. Many men have 
effeminate features, and many women have masculine features, even 
outside of the transgender umbrella.  
Nor will a determination based on mannerism suffice. Mannerisms are 
not only not determinative of biological sex, but it is illegal to discriminate 
in employment based upon contra-gender behavior or appearance under 
Price Waterhouse. This restriction means that an employer who singles 
out and takes adverse employment action against an employee based upon 
gendered mannerisms or appearance is exposing itself to legal action under 
Title VII, whether or not that employee has physically normative sexual 
organs. There is simply no legal way for an employer to reliably and 
 
 
 92. Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (1984), and Oiler v. Winn-Dixie La., Inc., No. 00-
3114, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17417 (E.D. La. Sept. 16, 2002), would be particularly apt references to 
make for this purpose, since even outside of the legal reasoning used, the language employed is useful 
for framing transgender employees as “other than” male and female. Given the language used in 
Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1997), to believe that a court would adopt this 
discriminatory language is no stretch. 
 93. In context, persons whose gender, gender identity, sex, or sexual orientation is not in line 
with heteronormative standards, but who nonetheless expresses themselves or pass as heteronormative, 
are “outed” when said gender, sex, or orientation is revealed to the world without their consent. Outing 
naturally subjects the person outed to increased scrutiny, suspicion, and danger. 
 94. See Pérez-Peña, supra note 89. 
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safely single out transgender employees under a BFOQ should the law 
permit employers to do so.
95
  
Finally, in order for a business to institute a natural law sex-based 
BFOQ, it would have to request proof of anatomical normativity from 
current and potential employees at birth and at present. The least intrusive 
way to prove anatomy is with medical records. Even then, though, this 
demand is extremely intrusive upon the privacy of one’s employees. The 
medical records in question would also have to indicate physical 
anatomical shape, hormone levels, and chromosome count and status.
96
 
Finally, since part of the alleged purpose of these BFOQs is to protect both 
employees and clients from offenses to dignity, instituting such a 
requirement seems to be entirely counterproductive—even if that request 
for medical records is strictly legal.  
The absurdity of Devoureau’s termination becomes obvious. No 
analysis can vindicate the use of this BFOQ without drawing upon natural 
law and thereby tying assumed-gender behavior, such as the ability or 
inability to maintain a professional demeanor while supervising a drug-test 
urination, to the suspected biology of the observer. A constructionist 
understanding of sex makes this BFOQ entirely unnecessary. Under such 
an understanding, there is no question that Devoureau identifies as male, 
was identified by both the government and his employer as male, and as 
such is male for all practical purposes. He is perfectly well-equipped to 
supervise urine sampling and prevent urine substitutions and other illicit 
behavior. His gender and sex are no more questionable than those of any 
other employee hired as a man. Urban Treatment’s clients would have no 
more suspicion or reason to complain of an offense to dignity committed 
by Devoureau than if any other male-identified person were supervising. 
Devoureau’s gender expression is all that clients require, and he cannot be 
fired solely on the basis of that gender expression under the precedent set 
by Price Waterhouse. 
 
 
 95. This is assuming it would even be legal to single out individual employees for inquiry into 
medical records. The Americans with Disabilities Act specifically indicates that no employer may 
demand a medical examination of an individual entering employee unless it requires the same of all 
entering employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3)(A) (2009). 
 96. These three indicators are often requested when demanding or contesting “proof” of sex from 
transgender individuals. Even if one’s gender marker, anatomical shape, and hormone indicators all 
indicate one sex, chromosomal markers may still be used to “prove” that a person is transgender. 
Rarely, however, are chromosomal markers requested of gender-normative non-trans individuals, nor 
ought they be requested of anyone.  
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C. Sex-Based BFOQs and the Transgender Observed 
A sex-based BFOQ’s natural law adherence not only causes damage to 
the employee and employer, but also to third parties who are in the care of 
or under observation by the employer and employee. The same norms that 
require that a strict anatomical line be drawn between male and female and 
that exclude those persons who do not fit within a sex-normative 
framework falter when it comes to categorization of the observed. Sex-
based BFOQs exist almost strictly within cross-sex scenarios and prevent 
harm to the supposed weaker of the involved sexes, and prevent some 
measure of legally unacceptable indignity to both. As a result, the 
observed parties must be strictly segregated by sex, or the BFOQ cannot 
be instituted.  
The problem, naturally, is that not all persons fall within those strictly 
defined sexes. When the observed are inmates of correctional institutions, 
there is no option to terminate employment or to simply walk away from 
the situation in which one is observed. Typically, such situations lead 
authorities to follow the natural law prescription with regards to original 
anatomy rather than apply constructionist principles to determine the 
safest option with the least harm to dignity—the purported end of natural 
law BFOQs.  
1. Tanya Guzman-Martinez and The Incarceration Dilemma 
In 2010, Tanya Guzman-Martinez filed suit against the Corrections 
Corporation of America as a result of its natural law norms.
97
 Tanya had 
crossed the U.S.-Mexico border and applied for asylum in the United 
States due to her fear that her gender identity would subject her to danger 
in Mexico.
98
 While Tanya’s application was pending, she was detained in 
the Eloy Detention Center. Despite Tanya’s identification as a woman, her 
expression of her gender identity, her appearance, and medical history, 
authorities detained Tanya in an all-male housing unit. While present in 
this unit, she was not only victimized by other inmates due to her 
appearance and gender identity, but also by at least one guard, who would 
force her to “watch him masturbate into a styrofoam cup and then 
 
 
 97. Guzman-Martinez v. Corr. Corp. of Am., No. CV 11-02390-PHX-NVW, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97356 (D. Ariz. July 13, 2012). Because the Detention Center adopted a normative model for 
sex that excluded transpersons, Guzman-Martinez was forced into the all-too-common position of 
being a transgender woman assigned to a male-only detention center.  
 98. Id. at *4. 
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[demand] that she ingest his ejaculated semen.”99 The unit failed to house 
her with women, as she requested, and also failed to give her a confined 
cell, which she also requested.
100
  
The trial court found that as Tanya was “biologically male,”101 housing 
Tanya in a women’s facility would violate the constitutional rights of other 
prisoners and impermissibly burden the system.
102
 However, the court 
provided no indication as to how such an arrangement would 
“impermissibly burden” the system.103 Similarly, the court did not explain 
how a single-occupancy cell in a women’s facility would cause 
unconstitutional punishment for Tanya as a woman. The court seemed to 
take as given that a single-occupancy cell in a facility where a woman 
prisoner’s gender makes her a target for sexual harassment and abuse both 
from other inmates and her overseers does not constitute unconstitutional 
punishment. As a matter of law, in contesting her prison conditions, the 
court found that Tanya failed to state a claim for relief because there are 
no legal standards yet established for the housing or treatment of 
transgender prisoners.
104
 The key was that the court found her 
“biologically male,” but at the moment there is no reliable method of 
transforming every possible biological gender marker upon which the 
court could have relied.
105
  
A natural law jurisprudence is therefore capable of perpetuating 
correctional atrocities such as those suffered by Ms. Guzman-Martinez by 
relying on the concept of “biological distinction.” Biological distinction is 
such a nebulous and inaccurate quality that any court could interpret it to 
limit the rights of a transgender or intersex person, regardless of the 
person’s biology.106  
 
 
 99. Id. at *8. This sexual abuse and battery were accompanied by other verbal harassment, slurs, 
and threats over an extended period of time. Id. 
 100. Id. at *7. Deprivation of single occupancy cells for inmates who are subject to specific 
violence is counter to the requirements of the American Correctional Association Standards. Id. 
 101. Id. at *25–26. 
 102. Id.  
 103. Id. at *26. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Nor should any person be required to transform every possible gender marker in such a 
fashion. In this case, the court does not clearly indicate which marker it uses to categorize Guzman-
Martinez’s sex, but the court does refer to her as “biologically male.” Id. at *25-26. The court also 
notes Tanya’s preparation for gender confirmation surgery. Id. at *7. Because “male biology” used as 
an indicator, it seems unlikely Guzman-Martinez would have been able, as a woman, to avoid being 
treated as a man even had she already undergone further medical treatment. 
 106. As ludicrous as it may seem to suggest that prison officials would move goal posts to allow 
rather than prevent atrocities, at least one prison official has stated a preference for a DNA-based 
gender identification system for transgender prisoners. Sydney Tarzwell, The Gender Lines Are 
Marked With Razor Wire: Addressing State Prison Policies and Practices for the Management of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/4
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2. Gender, Sex, and the Bona Fide Abuser 
Neither the abuse committed against Ms. Guzman-Martinez nor the 
court’s inability or unwillingness to address this abuse is a novel 
occurrence. Transgender persons, particularly persons of color, are 
arrested and subjected to prison sentences disproportionately more often 
than non-transgender defendants are subjected to the same sentences.
107
 
Some municipalities include gender-nonconforming behavior among sex 
offenses, and not only disproportionately persecute transgender persons, 
but subject them to permanent sex offender status.
108
 Within the corrective 
system, prison staff create a hyper-gendered environment that results in 
violence, sexual abuse, and rape of transgender prisoners by other 
detainees and by prison staff themselves at a higher frequency than the 
general prison population.
109
 These disproportionate abuses occur in both 
men’s and women’s facilities.110 Therefore, the potential for abuse is likely 
not inherent to any particular gender or sex demographic.  
The normative standards, however, inherent to that gender or sex 
demographic may determine the form the abuse takes. The cause of abuse 
therefore likely lies within the hyper-gendered nature of the environment. 
This hyper-gendered environment is the natural product of institutions 
employing a sex-based BFOQ. Because these BFOQs result in a gendered 
selection, rather than a strictly sex-based selection, the natural law gender 
standards that reinforce the BFOQ are amplified within the employee 
population. In a closed system, such as a prison, where the observed may 
not leave the environment created by the observers, I believe that such 
normative behavior is further reinforced. Transgressions against gender 
normative behavior may be persecuted more frequently and with less 
regard for the life or safety of the transgressor.
111
 This closed cycle harms 
 
 
Transgender Prisoners, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 167, 195 (2006). Such a system would ensure 
that transgender prisoners were misgendered and subjected to heightened rates of sexual abuse without 
the possibility of being assigned a facility appropriate to their sex. See Valerie Jenness et al., Violence 
in California Correctional Facilities: An Empirical Examination of Sexual Assault (2007), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/endsilence/documents/ViolenceinCaliforniaCorrectionalFacilities.pdf. 
 107. Tarzwell, supra note 106, at 197.  
 108. Id. at 172. 
 109. Id. at 179–80. Transgender inmates are more than thirteen times more likely to be abused 
than is the general population. Jenness et al., supra note 106, at 42. 
 110. Tarzwell, supra note 106, at 177–80. 
 111. In addition, safety and medical treatment of transgender detainees is still a developing and 
contested jurisprudence. A textbook example of this jurisprudence occurs in Maggert v. Hanks, 
wherein Judge Posner held that adequate medical care for transgender persons in prison might 
incentivize transgender people to commit crimes in order to receive care. 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 
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the entire prison population, but results in a specific targeting of 
transgender persons, who by definition defy normative gender standards. 
The result is that the sex-based BFOQ which relies upon natural law 
creates situations almost identical to those that it is purported to prevent: 
namely, physical violence and offense to dignity arising out of conflicts of 
gender and sex.
112
  
CONCLUSION 
As much as one might like to believe otherwise, natural law principles 
still have a firm hold upon our judicial system. By adhering to these 
principles, which draw lines between sexes based upon antiquated moral 
alarmism, our judicial system stunts its ability to make itself accessible to 
persons of every gender, biology, and sex. By enforcing laws based on 
these principles, without adapting jurisprudence to allow for variations in 
sex, the judicial system restricts the way the world responds to transgender 
and intersex persons and limits their recourse when recourse is 
appropriate.  
BFOQs reinforce such a system by ensuring that the workplaces where 
employees are most vulnerable are able to perpetuate illegal gender 
discrimination and create a foothold for antiquated jurisprudence. But as 
transpersons—who have historically been a hidden part of western 
society—come forward in increasing numbers, and awareness of 
transpersons increases to the point where jurists and legislators have to 
take note, the jurisprudence of natural law gets forced into a corner. Its 
adherents must choose either to hand down unjust verdicts, with language 
that betrays the antiquated motive of normative entrenchment, or to 
manipulate the language of statutes in order to preserve the strict meanings 
of “male” and “female.” These courses cannot hold, however. With a more 
 
 
1997). Given the rampant abuse and particular risks that transgender individuals face in prison, even 
beyond the typical danger, it requires a tremendous stretch of logic to assume that transgender 
individuals in general, or even any non-transgender individuals, are so sociopathic and so 
overwhelmingly consumed by the incentive to receive particular expensive medical care that the 
benefit could be perceived to outweigh both the social conscience required to intentionally commit a 
felony subject to imprisonment and the very real danger of subjecting oneself to rape and risk of death 
in prison solely to receive that treatment. 
 112. At the time of writing, the incarceration of Chelsea Manning in military prison is also a 
contested issue. Chelsea, a transgender woman of particular prominence, is housed in a men’s military 
prison in contravention of federal prison standards. This violation is the result of military policy, which 
disallows transpeople from service in any capacity, and which therefore makes no accommodations for 
transpeople being held in military prisons. This systemic ban raises a much broader question, and one 
not within the scope or substance of this Note. 
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visible transgender presence, jurisprudence is shifting to account for the 
constructive nature of gender and the way that gender defines sex.  
Sex-based BFOQs are a structural core of a natural law system, and 
they are structures that both actively endorse and further violence and 
oppression. An active approach to constructionist philosophy and 
jurisprudence will allow the deconstruction of this deeply entrenched 
system, and will provide justice not only for transpersons, but for 
individuals of every gender and sex who are harmed, othered, or 
marginalized by an acceptance of the harms that a strictly-sexed 
jurisprudence overlooks or endorses.  
I urge modern jurists to adopt such an approach in their understanding 
of sex and gender going forward. This adopted view will allow everyone 
with even nominal access to the law the full benefit of its protection. It 
will also provide all persons with the opportunity to engage in productive 
and gainful employment safely and without fear of intrusion into and 
redefinition of their identities. 
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